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t
John E.R. Wood* N7 15 0 2 5
ABSTRACT: Given no con_tralnts on size, the airship could carry a
any_.hlng almost anywhere. Economics and practical difflculties arise of
course, and the problem then becomes one of relative assessment of the
..] problems and prospects involved in any area of possible application. This
_" must then be integrated with an economic evaluation of the selected project
area. A review of the marketability of the airship is given, and the relative !
energy consumption and speed potential of the airship is compared to other [
modes and guidelines to areas of initial development are also provided,
. together with a brief historical review.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION _
A Convention such as this represents a long awaited opportunity to examine objectively and
critically the problems and prospects of what is, after all, a totally new concept of transport.
The term "totally new" will no doubt provoke a certain amount of protest, but it is in fact
perfectly Justifiable, although it is of course true that an established hierarchy of airships,
differing not only in size b,lt also in payload, range and indeed all the other factors which
are normally associated with logical series of craft, operated over a period of some forty
years. But the operation of these craft must not be interpreted as having been conceived
along lines of assessment remotely similar to those that must be considered today.
The airship may have been conceived as a vessel of peace, but it owes much of its early
impetus of development to the demands of war. In a period of growing international rivalry
between Britain and Germany, at a time when powered heavier than air flight was a thing of
the future this was hardly surprising. The period 1900 - 1920 saw a continuous, steady
development of the airship with a natural acceleration of this development, as the Great
War approached. The great majority of this development was concentrated in Germany, in a
Germany that was nationalistic enough, probably Justifiably, to feel that it had little to learn
from other countries, and that had even less desire to communicate this information abroad.
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The partial success, more evident in the manpower it kept 'tied up' in Great Britain for
defensive purposes than by any damage they caused would probably have encouraged the
Germans to have continued development immediately after the cessation of hostilities, but
the hand of retribution was still firmly in place, and anything that smacked of a rebirth
of German industry was heavily curtailed.
In these circumstances, the hand, if not of friendship, then at least of partnership, which
was advanced by the U.S.A. wastoogood to miss albeit at the cost of much injured pride.
Thus, in the early 20's the Goodyear-Zeppelin consortia came into being.
Let us recap the situation so far. The initial developm,_nt of these craft took place against
a background of Nationalism, at a time when no other form of powered flight existed. Against
this background it is easy to understand how a situation developed whereby the design of
these craft came to be based t,pon constraints of money available, and the limitations, or
i expected limitations of the technology available. It was naturally assumed that development
..... 4 of larger, faster 'better' ships was an economically desirable aim. Market analysis as we r
know it was virtually unheard of, and the question of designing for overall profitability was
hardly considered.
After the war the interest shown In these craft was still based upon the simple fact that civil
L. operation over Trans-Oceanic distances at speeds greater than a liner was unachieval_le.
Therefore speed being an obviously desirable factor, anyti:ing that could decrease this time
must capture a market: The holes in this logic, even then, should be fairly obvious, how
much more so today, with a plethora of alternative transport modes, and opportunities for
_nvestment available. (Unfortunately, recent aeronautical experience, particularly in the U.K.
indicate that lessons from the past are difficult to learn properly).
Again, designers and manufacturers, anxious to develop what was at the time a unique trans-
port mode, w_re, to put it kindly, optimistic about the difficulties of maintenance, mooring,
running costs, the development potential of these craft, and a whole host of other areas of
critical importance to profitability. In the earliest stages, when few craft were operating,
and when little or no 'feedback' information could be obtained, this was understandable.
When the operating results of these craft were staring these people in the face, it was per-
haps less so. Even so, one must not be too damming. There is always a dichotomy between
the potential of a mode, and the ability of any particular marque uf craft to meet that poten-
tial. Then, as now, the dictum was "wait until you see the next oneI'. This problem was
aggrevated by the fact that much design work carried out by the Germans in the early part of
the War was only Just being evaluated by other nations (notr'bly, Great Br_t_dn) some seven
or eight years afterwards. Nowhere was development proceeding from a current 'base
level' ano administrative failures (and rivalry) meant that nLuch needed information was often i
not crossing company, let along country boundaries. A number of small concerzzs, primarily
in the U.S. displayed commendable technical ingenuity in producing airships displaying novel
construction techniques. But again one is left with the feeling that many of the orlgl.,mtors
were not over cautious about minimising the difficulties involved i_.z*scaling t,p' such craft to
a practical size, and, with the number of craft avsllable to them, the limited financial
backing, and the lack of much in the way of 'sophisticated' data lugging devices, the claims
made for the ease with which such craft could be up-graded must be regarded with caution.
On the military side, the development of the Akron and Macon must rank foremost in the
developments cf the inter war years. Anyone who ha_ read Richard Smith's extraordinarily
fine book cannot fail to be surprised and heartened by the enthusiasm and progress that was
achieved, nor can they ignore the lack of admihistrative liason, the funding difficulties, and
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the vague feeling that many elements within the project had differing ideas about what function li
* the craft were in fact, designed for. One would venture a guess that far too little planning
was done. especially in determining the operational requirements of the craft, at the pre-
construction phase. That is conjecture, what is not, is that these craft were, at best, a
limited success, and all the while, waiting in the wings and growing larger, more powerful,
more potent, was the aeroplane, destined to overshadow the airship almost completely. That
this was so was due far less to the undoubted technical failures of the large airship, than to
the economic profitability and ease of reaching diverse markets, cotlpled with the wider
throughput, and greater reliability of service which the aeroplane offered at the time.
,_, PRESENT DAY ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES
q-
Why such a long introduction, simply because many of the basic criteria contained have not
been recognised by many of those that support the introduction of the airship as a transport '
service device. The use of the word 'introduction' rather than 're introduction' ia intent-
ional, for reasons which I hope have been made obvious.
The world has come a long way, politically, socially and economically since those far
off days. It may be argued that it has not gone tht, right way, but what is certain is that
critical assessment of high cost technology, or t_ _echnolo?. v that may have wide ranging
implications has grown up, fast.
We live .i a world d extensive communications, of multi-national corporations indulging In
a multlt_',ie of differing activities, of rapidly developing markets, and of rapidly escalating
costs.
We have reached a stage where the travelling public think little of travelling in an aircraft
,, costing thirty million dollars, which is, as near as dammlt, perfectly constructed, and is
operated by an organisation massive in its support, training and maintenance facilities. That
aircraft is not simply an established part of our transport infrastructure, it is the develop-
ment nct of a single company, but of fifty years of overall aeronautical development, a
development which, in recent times at least, has become coordinated internationally in all
aspects of its operation to an unprecedented, and uncompleted degree; specifications and
safety requirements, of unheard of se_'erlty are laid down for everything from a glider to
a Jumbo Jet by international organisations, and design standards are established long before
the first nut and bolt have been put together. In simple terms, everything that flies today,
other than the simplest light aircraft, is the hlgh cost product of a hlgh cost, large scale
operation, not the smallest of these costs, naturally enough, are due to the heavily Increased
administrative costs which accompany operations of thls scale.
And yet, Into thls 'new arena' of cost estimation, came a strange body of men, enthusiasts
one and all and, In many cases, simply not appreciating the cost of developing the points
made above. This Is by no means a total observation, but it does apply to a dishearteningly
large number of people who are now waving the flag for airships. One of the main reasons
for this strange state of affairs Is almost cer*ainly due to the fairly distinct division which _-
at present exists within the fledgling airship movement, on the _me hand, the engineer,
obviously unlikely to have been professionally connected with Lighter Than Air for any con-
slderable period of time, or indeed likely to have been involved in anything approaching a
large investment programme of research into L. T, A. and on the other, the marketing man, _
who is obviously keen on drumming up interest in what is, potentially at least, _tvery large
area for Investment. In many cases it must be obvious that each, although passionately
enthusiastic, often has little contact with the other, and neither appears to take account of
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the other transport modes available, and of the effect the reaction of these other .-nodes to the
project would have on the overall potential of the scheme.
_ , There Is a bewildering array of designs at present available, ranging from the conventional
to the unlikely, wlth round, fiat, double hulled and otherhull forms, and power units ranging
/ from diesel engines to atomic reactors. But a question which must be asked is what were
the design consldsratior_s that produced these ideas? If ene sees a 400 ton payload craft for
/ example, why not a 500 or 800, or 200 ton ship. Have the advantages, and difficulties
I involved In deslplng for higher speeds and larger sizes been sufflciestly appreclxlted from
the vital econ-_mlc an well as the technical aspects, and to what extent is current _Ircraft
data concerned wl;h areas such as handling characteristics been extrapolated In order to -
provide even technical Justification for the various craft. Most important of all, what t ,-
• markets and products have these craft been designed to cater for? In many cases it would _
seem tlmt this question has been left alone. The assumption being that, if a craft of a certain
...._-- size and transport capacity exists, then the market wlll gravitate towards it. This is a false •
premise, and represents a classic case of putting the cart before the horse. Without a _
knowledge of the market then no design can claim proper viability.
The results of this present attitude may be summed up as follows:
1. The majority of the largest, most ambitious designs originate from the smaller
design concerns. Many of whom are operating on a part-time, ,_nfunded basis.
2. Many of the 'failure areas' of previous rigid airships have not been properly
considered. Most notable amongst these areas being the structural Inadequacy,
high maintenance, and high manpower requirements of the conventional
Zeppelin deslgn.
3. There is a tendency to assume that a particular type of construc_.Iou is "the
best" rather than realising that the type of coustructlou which represents
an optimum is dynamic and varies with, size, speed, and market.
4. In general, and for a variety of reasons, the unit costs, development costs,
and administrative costs of running such a project have been underestimated,
in some cases to a ludicrous extent.
5. Very little attention has been paid to "off vehicle'' costs, those associated
with terminal facilities, mai.teoance etc.
6. Many organisations have presented the "final model" of their craft, without
giving any indications of the cost and exten_ of the pre-production aiid
prototype programme.
7. The time to in service operation is often so little that it must be considered
that in many cases, the design process is assumed to be complete. If the total
funding and manpower inputs are examined this will be an unlikely situation.
8. Little attention has been paid to the fact that no airship building infrastructure
exists. Hindenburg for example was the end product of an organisation that
had been :nex_stence for forty years. (With a very large proportlon of the
original staff still employed. ) The loss of the_e indefinable t_dvantages whlch
result from the existence of such a 'worked up' organisation are assumed to
i14
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Jbe catered for by the rather nebulous term "advances in material technology".
These advantages, certainly in many areas, are less than is generally supposed,
and often will impose a high cost dlsbeneflt on the craft, which is usually ignored.
Most of the above reads like a roll-call of horror. It might reasonably be inferred that the
purpose of this report is to dampen the rapidly growing interest in L. T.A. Nothing could be !
further from the truth. The airship appears to offer a number of very promising areas for ' -_
investment and development. The purpose of the foregoing has been to ensure that these
areas of development are examined from a suitably critical viewpoint.
ANALYSING THE MARKET ,i
It has already been stressed that there is no single optimum type of airship. It is unlikely ' "
at this stage that any s!ngle agency Is going to finance a world survey in order to evaluate
the potential application of virtually all freight movements to the airship. Indeed such an
exercise would be purely academic. Reasonably enough, most interest in the use of airships _ ,
will continue to centre around those market areas that are not providing good enough econo-
mics at present, or are failing to meet the demand that is present. This failure may be due _
either to a lack of availability of the present transport mode or to certain inherent dsficien-
cles In the mode (high running costs, labour Intensive etc. ) or it may simply be that the i
market has expanded greatly, and the mode has been unable to expand with it, whilst retalnlng
its initial profitability. There is a second area of very great importance, where markets have _"
developed without the associated ground based transport infrastructure having been developed.
This often occurs in areas that have experienced rapid economic growth in recent years, and
that have extraordinarily difficult topogl_phlcal probler_s (mo_mtainc. forests, etc. ).
It Is likely therefore that the market that will require investigation will be a victim of one or
more of the above constraints, and that the markot will be suggested by an outside source.
Th_ problem that then presents itself is one of comparing the likely costs of meeting demand
using an airship with the. costs involved using an alternative system.
BASIC CONSIDERATIONS OF THE AIRSHIP
Initially, having decided on an are_ of investigation, some form of "first pa_s" estimate must
be obtained to determine whether there is any hope whatsoever of using the craft profitably.
To this end it may be usefLl to state some fairly anfe assumptions.
I. The conventional airship is slower in airspeed tha_ an aircraft.
2. The trip end facilities required for an airship are less tl,_anfor any aircraft.
and for airships with payload ranges of 2 - 20 t _ns or thereabouts they are a
lot less than for an aircraft of similar oapaclty.
3. An airshil)s ruanlng costs On terms of fuel c(,_ts) increase rapidly with speed,
and relatively slowly with size.
4. The annual utilisation of a small airship should be as good as that of a small
aircraft.
5. The initial utilisation nf a large craft would be unlikely to be even as good as
s large aircraft. _:_
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6. The first costs of a sm_ll airship (paylo._ range 2 - 20 tons) would, or rather
should, be less than for an aircraft of similar size.
. 7. The first costs of a large airship would ]:e unlikely to be substantially less than
for a large airliner.
8. A small to medium size airship would be capable of a far quicker tlme to in
service use than a large craft.
9. The degree of investment required to produce facilities for building and main- 4.
taining a large airship would be disproportionately high in comparisoo to the , ..
sums required for a small craft.
i With the previou_ statements in mind, let us now examine the basic steps necessary to
i evaluate any particular potential area of application.
i Historically, there he.s always been a relationship between the various sizes of craft and the
type of construction which represented an optimum for each size range. These were approx-
i,_ately as follows:
Simple "Blimp,' type = _1000, 00_) Cu. Ft.
Semi Rigid Type = 200, 000 - 2000, 000 Cu. Ft.
"Zeppelin" Type Rigid = ] 000, 000 - 8000, 000 Cu. Ft.
Nowadays it '.s suggested that improvements in tec,'tnlcal design capability have not only
resulted in the coming into being of several new types, but have increased the size range
for the craft very considerably.
Simple "Blimp" type = (1000, 000 Cu. Ft.
Internally Supported = 1000, 000 - 25, 000, 000 Cu. Ft.
"Blimp"
"Zeppelin" Type Rigid =- I000. 000 - 50, 000, 000 Cu. Ft.
Monecoque (Supported) = 2, 000, 000 - 200, 000, 004) Cu. Ft.
Type Rig!d
These are generalisations, and do not represent the thoughts of all connected with L. T. A.
(Notable exceptions would inc]cde the Blimp desig:s of Argyropoulous and Sonstegaard,
which are larger than _py sizes here considered) I_ut, in general, they a:'e a fair example
of current design trends.
with these basic classifications in mind, the tmsic steps involved in evaluating "an alrshII_'
against any selected market may be considered as follows.
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:, ANALYSING A MARKET. NINE FUNDAMENTAL STEPS ._
1. Analyse data relative to existing and projected commodity flows for selected _
markets. !_,
2. Examine the topographical and meteorological data to obtain payload and
utilisation figures for a craft.
3. Based on information obtained so far (tons/year and utilisation) construct
a graph of number of craft/size of individual craft.
4. Modify this informat:on to take account of a network transport system (i. e. t
on-going goods with seperate pick-up points) if this is required. ,-
5. Examine trade offs between increased speed (greater fuel consumption,
different power requ|rem_nts etc.) and size (trip end facilities, mooring
•_ facilities, assembly and difficulties, construction costs, control problems, _
etc.) relate results obtained to Item 4.
6. Having ascertained size and and number of craft required (based on _convent- !_
ional' airship types and speeds, determine capital costs for craft, together
with costs for trip end facilitiee.
7. Determine animal cash outgoings for the operation including maintenance,
insurance, return on capital, fuel and manpower costs, to p_ovide a total
cost/_ear.
'_ 8. ,vide total costs/year by tons/year to be operate'] to give a costs/ton.
! 9. Compare costs so obtained with costs/ton obtained by existing or projected ;!
:_ alternative modes, conduct a risk analysis on this figure, and, based on the
results obtained Go/No Go.
l The reason for evaluating designs based on convent}onal theory, moving at conventional _:
speeds, is based solely on the phUvsophical principle known as "Hackmans Razor", that is
Investigate the most likel__an_s_w_ezs_fi_rgt,a simple enough concept, and one that is frequently
forgotten.
MARKET ANALYSIS FOR MILITARY APPLICATIONS _i
Nothing has been said so f_r about the potential of L. T.A. to military applications. This is !
solely because the criteria for evaluation are so very different to those normally applied to !
civil applications. Much will doubtless be said about military applications during this iI
workshop, and it is an area which Aerospace Developments has investigated at length. _'ithin i
tl=e confines of this paper, all that may be saia is that the inherent qualitie_ of long range,
high speed, and good ststton keeping combined with good payload ability, suggest applications
in both A. E.W. and A. S. W. w!tb perhaps less attractive applications for heavy assault
craft. -,_
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_ MARKETING
The basic physical parameters which require investigation when assessing the economic
; viability of the airship have been outlined. There are, however, a number of factors which
are somewhat subjective, which determine with equal importance the degree of success which
_ the project will ultimately achieve. These "saleable" qualities may be regarded as "market-
_ trigI,.
PROJECT EVALUATION (Figure 1. )
_ "The Whole World's a Stage" as Shakespeare said, and likewise what one sees depends very
' much upon where one sits. In any airship operation there are likely to be three main
"characters" and the prime requirements that each will have In the project, in isolation, are
shown in the Illustration. There are other factors which may well be advantageous to the
J project, yet which have nothing to do with the basic requirements of. either the customer, the
_"_ operator, or the manufacturer. A prime example of this is the degree to which current air- •
craCt designs are being factored around "environmental" considerations. (Quietness, low
_ po!lution, etc.) Such factors may actually decrease the attraction for the operator (higher
_. running costs),, the manufacturer (higher development costs) and the customer (higher freight
chsrges) and yet, the degree to which the craft can meet these external constraints can sig-
:" " niflcantly Improve the market penetration of the type. It Is the function of the marketing
: aspect of such a project, as defined here, to make the main partners in any such venture
ii aware of the importance of these external factors.
It r.mst also be remembered that the development of any new transport mode provides a great
opportunity in terms of marketing simply because It is a new mode, especially If It appears
, that this new mode may be established at a relatively low cost.
The financial climate Is also likely to have an effect on any military development. It Is easy
_ to see that, if funding overall Is fairly tight, then a project stands a far greater chance of
._eiving financial support If it can be cross Justified across civil applications as well. The
basic design of "an airship" Is remarkably similar for any application, be it carrying cargo
or Son ar gear. It would, for example be a very difficult Job to justify the B. 1. bomber
as being suitable for use by the Timber Ind,mtry also. It Is kot likely to be so difficult for
an airship'
THE "TRANSPORT EFFICIENCY" OF THE AIRSHIP
The functions of illustrations 2, 3 and 4 (Ref. 1) is simply to show that we are living In a
world where fuel costs are likely to rise, and where oil fuel is likely to continue to be req-
uired in ever increasing quantities for transport use. Figure 5 shows the dramatic increase
that has occurred In air transport which suggests that the "ma.,'_:etabiltty" of air transport
is based on subjective as well as objective appraisal and that the decision to go by air Is
' Influencedby powerfuladvertisingpressure, As fuelcostsIncreaseso thetradeoffbetween
thefuelcostsinvolvedand thespeed (oftenperceivedratherthanreal)and charisma of
"airtravel"willbe examined even more critically.The prospectoftheairship,withitslow
fuelconsumption,itslower initialcost,and itoabilitytouse low gradefuelseffectively
must inevitablybe considere.qfurther.Figure6 isan attempttoratethisefficiencyIn
relativeterms,ba_d on informationcollatedby BouladonoftheBattelleInstitute.Itreveals
a craftwithtransitspeedsofan expresstrain,or doublet_'_tofheavygroundtransport
_ operatingunderidealisedconditions,w!th_ fu_|en-_mutlon barelygreaterthanthelorry,
yetwithoutthenecessityforthemassive investmentInroadsand railwaysthatconventional
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1976007927-129
systems demand. It is an aircraft in the true sense of the word, offering good access capab-
ilities, with the possibility of remarkably low fur costs and, at least in the smaller sizes, : _i
low trip end costs, surely a concept worthy of further consideration, f
r
CONC LUSION
: f
This has been a brief discourse, couched in general terms for a general public, but I hope
that i; has shown that much time, effort and money has already been spent on examining the _,
application of L. T.A. to a wide variety of operational areas. There is no such thing as an
"ideal" airship. Each case, and each application MUST be considered in its own individual
light. There are many areas of such evaluation that will remain subjective, at lea_t for a * :
considerable time, but the ability to interpret these areas, and to ascribe to each of them _ _'_
their relative importance does exist, and should be utilised, T,.e Chinese have a proverb, - _
"The Flower must Grow from the See(_'. It will require very little investment to ensure i
that this first small seed is well planted, and from this, and this alone, will the true _ ¢ _
potential of this exciting phase of transport development be discerned, i :_
_ ;
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l , GROWTHOFWORLDTRAFFIC1953-1973 FIG.5 i:
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xlO x3.6 x2.5 x4
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AIR TRAFFIC ROAD TRAFFIC RNL TRAFFIC WORLDTRADE
xlO x3.6 (6.6%per year) x2.5 x4
(1953 =47 milliard pass/kin) (Z 2%per year)
(1973: 490 milliard pass/kin)
SPEEDANDENERGYCONSUMPTIONTRADE-OFFS FIG.6
J, i, i Jl
_ PIPELINE WATER ROAD
'L speed 2Okm/h speed Cargo Vessel speed Lorry
:,_ 450t.mile/USgal 30km/h (return empty)
"', 400t.mile/USgal 90km/h
43t.mile/USgal
m ii Jii i i
RAIL AIR AIRSHIP
speed (40Zemptytracks)speed (80%peyload) speed 160km/h
110km/h 900km/h 32t.mile/USgal '
166t.mile/USgal 4.3t.mile/USgal
i i
i ii ii i i i
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